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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
This case arises from an action brought by eighty-eight 
current and former police officers ("Appellants") employed 
by the Township of Teaneck ("Teaneck") in Teaneck, New 
Jersey.  Appellants contended that Teaneck violated the Fair 
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., by 
failing to: (1) pay proper overtime; (2) provide compensation 
for time spent attending daily roll calls ("muster time"); and 
(3) provide compensation for time spent putting on 
("donning") and taking off ("doffing") uniforms and 
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equipment each day.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Teaneck on all of Appellants' claims.  
For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.    
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Factual Background 
The Teaneck Policemen's Benevolent Association, 
Local 215, which represents Teaneck police officers, and the 
Superior Officer's Association, which represents Teaneck 
sergeants, lieutenants, and captains, have negotiated jointly 
with Teaneck since 1979.  The present dispute has its origins 
in a collective bargaining agreement (the "Agreement") that 
was in effect for an original term of January 1, 2004 to 
December 31, 2007, and which remained in effect through 
June 2011 due to an impasse in negotiations.      
1.  Overtime Compensation 
The Agreement provides that police officers work 
established and regularly recurring work periods of either 
seven or nine days.  These periods combine so that police 
officers are required to work an average of 39.25 hours per 
week over the course of a calendar year.  Officers work under 
either a "Six and Three" or a "Five and Two" plan.  Those 
working under the "Six and Three" plan work six eight-hour 
tours over six consecutive days and then have three 
consecutive days off.  Those under the "Five and Two" plan 
work five eight-hour tours over five consecutive days and 
then have two consecutive days off.   
If an officer performs work in excess of his or her 
normal hours in any tour of duty, that work is considered 
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overtime which is compensated at a rate of time and one-half.  
The Agreement provides for the accrual of overtime pay in 
blocks based on the amount of time worked after a regular 
tour.  For example, if an officer works less than 31 minutes 
past his scheduled tour, he receives no overtime; if the officer 
works between 31 minutes and 44 minutes past his scheduled 
tour, he receives 30 minutes of overtime; if he works between 
45 and 52 minutes past his scheduled tour, he receives 45 
minutes of overtime; and if he works between 53 and 59 
minutes past his scheduled tour, he receives one hour of 
overtime.  Any overtime beyond one hour accrues in blocks 
of 15 minutes.       
2.  Muster Time 
The Agreement also provides for inspection and roll 
call, or "muster time," which takes place ten minutes prior to 
the start of officers' tours and ten minutes at the end of their 
tours.  Officers are required to report for muster time dressed 
and prepared for duty.  The effect of muster time is that for 
each eight-hour tour, officers may work for eight hours and 
twenty minutes.  On any given day, officers may work less 
than the eight hours and twenty minutes depending on the 
length of the post-tour muster period.  In those instances, 
officers are still given credit for the full eight hours and 
twenty minutes.     
3.  Donning & Doffing 
The Agreement also sets forth specific uniform and 
equipment requirements to which Teaneck police officers 
must adhere while on duty.  The uniform components of 
individual police officers depend on whether the officer is 
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assigned to the "Uniform Division" or the "Non-Uniform 
Division."   
Regardless of assignment, there is no rule, regulation, 
or other policy requiring that police officers don or doff their 
uniform at Teaneck Police Headquarters.  However, some 
officers choose to don and doff partially at home and partially 
at work, and some choose to don and doff completely at 
Teaneck's headquarters, either in the locker rooms or their 
personal offices.  The option to change at work is primarily 
for the benefit of police officers who have indicated concerns 
regarding:  
(1) the risk of loss or theft of 
uniforms and gear at home; (2) 
potential access to the gear by 
family members; (3) distractions 
at home that might interfere with 
the donning process; (4) safety 
concerns with performing firearm 
checks at home; (5) discomfort 
associated with wearing the gear 
while commuting; (6) the 
increased risk of being identified 
as a police officer while off-duty; 
and (7) potential exposure of 
family members to contaminants 
and bodily fluids.   
 
App. at 115.   
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 The Agreement, as well as all prior collective 
bargaining agreements between the parties, is silent as to 
whether Teaneck officers are entitled to compensation for 
time spent donning and doffing.  Additionally, the officers' 
unions have never requested, through contract negotiations or 
other means, compensation for time spent donning and 
doffing.   
B.  Procedural Background 
On December 16, 2009, Local 215 filed a complaint 
against the Township of Teaneck under the FLSA to recover 
unpaid compensation for: (1) overtime; (2) time spent during 
muster time; and (3) time spent donning and doffing uniforms 
and equipment each day.  On June 9, 2010, an amended 
complaint was filed which removed Local 215 as a party to 
the suit and left only the officers, in their individual 
capacities, as plaintiffs.   
Teaneck subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, but 
the motion was terminated when the District Court stayed the 
case and directed the parties to mediation.  Following an 
unsuccessful mediation, the District Court held a pre-trial 
conference, at which Teaneck moved under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) to bar the officers from using any 
damages calculations that were not disclosed during 
discovery.  To that point, the only calculation of damages the 
officers had disclosed during the discovery process was a 
spreadsheet prepared by one of the officers' wives, which 
calculated individual officers' overtime hours based upon an 
eight-hour day.   
The spreadsheet identified the dates each officer 
worked and those in which the officer was in uniform and not 
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in uniform.  It assumed that each officer worked eight hours, 
plus 20 minutes in muster time, plus 30 minutes daily 
donning and doffing for uniformed officers and 15 minutes 
daily donning and doffing for non-uniformed officers.  Thus, 
according to the officers, they were entitled to overtime 
compensation for every day they worked 8 hours, regardless 
of how many hours they worked in a workweek or a work 
period.  The officers conceded that they did not produce 
anything in discovery that would provide a computation of 
damages under a 40-hour theory, but defended that course of 
action based upon their perception that the Agreement 
required overtime payment based upon an eight-hour day and 
not a 40-hour work week.  After hearing argument, the 
District Court concluded that there was "no reason why there 
should be any permission to go beyond that which was 
disclosed in discovery" and granted Teaneck's motion.  
Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment.  The District Court granted Teaneck's motion and 
denied the officers' motion on December 28, 2012.  In regards 
to the officers' overtime claim, the Court concluded that 
Teaneck qualified for an exemption to the general overtime 
provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)
1
, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 
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 See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (". . . no employer shall 
employ any of his employees who in any workweek is 
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 
commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless 
such employee receives compensation for his employment in 
excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one 





, and could, therefore, raise the overtime threshold for 
its employees.  The Court also noted that the officers had 
failed to produce sufficient evidence of missed overtime pay.  
Regarding muster time, the Court concluded that the 
Agreement contemplated such time as part of the "normal 
hours in any tour of duty" and was already a component of 
the officers' salaries.  Finally, because the officers had the 
option of donning and doffing their uniforms and gear at 
home, and the option to change at work benefitted the officers 
and not Teaneck, the District Court regarded such activities as 
preliminary and postliminary to the principal activity of 
police work and, therefore, were non-compensable under the 
FLSA.  The District Court also noted that § 203(o) of the 
FLSA, which excludes donning and doffing "from measured 
working time under the Agreement," provided an additional 
basis for denying the officers' donning and doffing claim.   
The officers' timely notice of appeal to this Court 
followed.  
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  We have appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
grant of summary judgment.  Madison v. Res. for Human 
Dev., Inc., 233 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 2000).  Summary 
judgment will be proper "if the pleadings, depositions, 
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 See 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) (increased employment 
overtime thresholds for public agencies engaged in fire 
protection or law enforcement activities). 
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answers to interrogatories . . . show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c).  In exercising such review, "[w]e view all evidence and 
draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-
movant, affirming if no reasonable jury could find for the 
non-movant."  Madison, 233 F.3d at 180 (citing Whiteland 
Woods, L.P. v. Township of West Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 
180 (3d Cir. 1999)).   
Our review of a district court's interpretation of the 
FLSA is plenary.  Id. (citing Stephens v. Kerrigan, 122 F.3d 
171, 176 (3d Cir. 1997).    
III.  DISCUSSION 
Appellants' challenge to the District Court's order is 
based upon a series of alleged factual and legal errors.  
Specifically, Appellants argue that the District Court erred in 
finding that: (1) Teaneck qualified for an exemption to the 
general overtime provisions, pursuant to § 207(k); (2) 
Appellants failed to meet their burden in establishing 
damages; (3) Appellants are compensated for muster time as a 
component of their salaries; (4) donning and doffing police 
uniforms and gear is non-compensable under the FLSA; and 
(5) § 203(o) of the FLSA forecloses Appellants from seeking 
compensation for donning and doffing.  We will address each 
argument in turn.   
A.  Overtime Compensation 
1.  The § 207(k) Exemption 
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Under the FLSA, employers are generally required to 
pay employees at overtime rates for work in excess of forty 
hours per workweek.  29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).  Section 207(k), 
however, contains a partial exemption from the general 
overtime provisions, permitting public agencies to establish a 
"work period" that lasts from seven to 28 days for employees 
engaged in law enforcement or fire protection activities.  29 
U.S.C. § 207(k).  The FLSA’s interpretative regulations 
define the term "work period" as "any established and 
regularly recurring period of work."  29 C.F.R. § 553.224(a).   
The exemption operates mainly "to soften the impact 
of the FLSA’s overtime provisions on public employers . . . 
[by] rais[ing] the average number of hours the employer can 
require [employees] to work without triggering overtime 
requirement[s]."  O’Brien v. Town of Agawam, 350 F.3d 279, 
290 (1st Cir. 2003); see also Lawrence v. City of Philadephia, 
527 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 2008) (recognizing that § 207(k) 
exempts certain public agencies from the overtime 
requirements set forth in § 207(a)).  It also "accommodates 
the inherently unpredictable nature of firefighting and police 
work by permitting employers to adopt work periods longer 
than one week."  Id.  Before a public employer may qualify 
for the § 207(k) exemption, however, two things must be true: 
(1) "the employees at issue must be engaged in fire protection 
or law enforcement within the meaning of the statute and (2) 
the employer must have established a qualifying work 
period."  Calvao v. Town of Framingham, 599 F.3d 10, 14 
(1st Cir. 2010) (citing Agawam, 350 F.3d at 290).  The 
employer bears the burden of proving that these conditions 
are satisfied.  Guthrie v. Lady Jane Collieries, Inc., 722 F.2d 
1141, 1143 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting that "[t]he burden of proof 
is on the employer to establish an [FLSA] exemption"); see 
 12 
also Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960).  
To meet this burden, the employer must demonstrate "that the 
employee and/or employer come 'plainly and unmistakably' 
within the exemption's terms."  Lawrence, 527 F.3d at 310 
(observing that FLSA exemptions should be construed 
narrowly and against the employer (citing Arnold, 361 U.S. at 
392)).   
In the instant case, neither party disputes that Teaneck 
police officers are engaged in law enforcement within the 
meaning of the FLSA; thus, the only issue before us is 
whether Teaneck established a qualifying work period.  
Appellants argue that it was error for the District Court to 
conclude that Teaneck qualified for and established a valid § 
207(k) work period because Teaneck never intended to adopt 
the exemption.  Teaneck, on the other hand, argues that an 
employer's burden under § 207(k) does not require a 
demonstration of intent.  The point of contention between the 
parties, namely, the means by which a law enforcement 
employer may establish a valid § 207(k) work period, is a 
matter of first impression for this Court.   
This question presents an issue of statutory 
interpretation.  "As with any question of statutory 
interpretation, our analysis begins with the plain language of 
the statute."  Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 
(2009).  We note first that the text of § 207(k) does not 
specify how an employer establishes a qualifying work 
period.  However, one thing is quite clear – nothing in the 
language of the statute requires employers to express their 
intent to qualify for or operate under the exemption.  See 29 
U.S.C. § 207(k) ("No public agency shall be deemed to have 
violated subsection (a) of this section with respect to the 
employment of any employee in . . . law enforcement 
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activities if [certain scheduling requirements are met].").  As 
Teaneck correctly observes, the statute only requires the 
existence of a qualifying work period.  Nothing more.  We 
will, therefore, decline to adopt a rule that requires employers 
to clear a hurdle not provided for in the statutory text.    
Accordingly, we hold that employers seeking to qualify for 
the § 207(k) exemption need not express an intent to qualify 
for or operate under the exemption.  Employers must only 
meet the factual criteria set forth in § 207(k). 
Appellants urge that two district court cases, O’Hara 
v. Menino, 312 F. Supp. 2d 99 (D. Mass. 2004) and Ackley v. 
Department of Corrections, 844 F. Supp. 680, 687 (D. Kan. 
1994), support a different outcome.  In O'Hara, a group of 
police officers brought an action against the city in which 
they worked, alleging violations of the FLSA regarding 
overtime compensation.  312 F. Supp. 2d at 103.  The district 
court in that case concluded that the city was not entitled to 
the § 207(k) exemption because it had neither adopted a 
qualifying work period during the time at issue, nor was one 
in place.  Id. at 106.  The court relied on language found in a 
footnote in Agawam, which noted that employers were 
required to "announce and take bona fide steps to implement 
a qualifying work period" in order to take advantage of the § 
207(k) exemption.  Id. at 105 (citing Agawam, 350 F.3d at 
291 n.21).   
Similarly, in Ackley, the district court held that the 
defendant had not met its burden of proving that it adopted a 
§ 207(k) workweek exemption.  Ackley v. Dep't of Corrs., 
844 F. Supp. 680, 687 (D. Kan. 1994).  The district court 
relied on an interdepartmental memorandum pertaining to 
overtime compensation, which stated that all non-exempt 
employees were eligible for overtime compensation for hours 
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worked in excess of 40 hours in a work week.  Id.  Based 
upon this memorandum, the district court concluded that the 
employer compensated its employees in accordance with § 
207(a).  Id.  The district court concluded that the employer 
failed to produce any evidence that would contradict such a 
conclusion, and made note that the employer's § 207(k) 
argument appeared to have only been raised after suit was 
filed to avoid liability.  Id.  Appellants rely on Ackley to 
support their argument that Teaneck's Personnel Policies and 
Procedures Manual (the "Manual"), as well as testimony from 
Teaneck Police Department personnel, prove that the § 207(k) 
exemption should not apply to Teaneck.  Regarding the 
Manual, Appellants contend that the document fails to 
provide any indication that overtime payment for officers 
would be in accordance with § 207(k).  Regarding the 
testimony, Appellants assert that not one agent of Teaneck 
could even testify as to what the § 207(k) exemption was or 
whether it had been adopted.    
Neither O'Hara nor Ackley alter our analysis.  
Appellants’ reliance on O’Hara, as well as the footnote citing 
to a First Circuit decision, is unpersuasive and foreclosed by 
more recent case law from the First Circuit, which rejects the 
notion that an employer is required to expressly state its intent 
to adopt a § 207(k) work period.  See Calvao, 599 F.3d at 16 
("On the undisputed facts, the Town’s actions were sufficient 
to establish a qualifying work period, despite the asserted lack 
of notice to its employees.").  The instant case can be further 
distinguished from O'Hara because the employer in that case 
never implemented a qualifying work period, which played a 
significant role in the outcome of the case.  Here, Appellants 
do not argue that Teaneck's "Five and Two" and "Six and 
Three" plans fail to meet the requirements of § 207(k).  Their 
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only argument is that Teaneck never made its intent to adopt 
the § 207(k) exemption known, which is not a requirement 
under § 207(k).  
Appellants’ reliance on Ackley is also foreclosed by 
more recent case law from the Tenth Circuit, which rejects a 
requirement that an employer expressly intend to adopt a § 
207(k) exemption.  See Spradling, 95 F.3d at 1505 (stating 
that an employer may establish a § 207(k) work period either 
by public declaration or by actually meeting the requirements 
of the exemption).  Appellants’ reliance on Ackley is further 
tainted by factual differences between that case and the 
instant case.  There, the district court noted that the defendant 
failed to produce any evidence that it defined a work period 
as 28 days and had actually compensated its employees in 
accordance with § 207(a).  Here, the undisputed facts, as well 
as current and former Agreements, reveal that officers work 
and are paid in accordance with "established and regularly 
recurring work periods" of either seven or nine days.  Finally, 
as concluded above, the relevant inquiry into whether an 
employer has established a qualifying work period does not 
include a subjective component.  Nor is there a requirement 
that employers make a public declaration or an express 
statement that the work period has been or will be adopted.  
Thus, Appellants' argument regarding the Manual and the 
testimony of Teaneck personnel also fails.     
Finally, we note that our holding here is in accordance 
with that of our sister Circuits.  All courts of appeals to 
consider this issue have held that, in order for an employer to 
qualify for the § 207(k) exemption, only a factual inquiry is 
involved and no notice or declaration of intent is required on 
the part of the employer.  See, e.g., Calvao, 599 F.3d at 12 
(rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that the Town was required 
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to notify affected employees before establishing a valid work 
period under § 207(k)); Barefield v. Vill. of Winnetka, 81 F.3d 
704, 710 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that nothing in the language 
of § 207(k) requires employers to express a "declaration of 
intent" to qualify for the exemption – an employer need only 
meet the factual criteria); Milner v. Hazelwood, 165 F.3d 
1222, 1223 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that FLSA police and 
firefighters exemption need not be established by public 
declaration); Spradling v. City of Tulsa, 95 F.3d 1492, 1505 
(10th Cir. 1996) (stating that an employer may establish a § 
207(k) work period either by public declaration or by actually 
meeting the requirements of the exemption); Freeman v. City 
of Mobile, 146 F.3d 1292, 1297 n.3 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(rejecting Appellants’ argument that the City never 
"intended" to avail itself of the § 207(k) exemption).    
Turning to the merits of the instant appeal, the record 
clearly demonstrates that Teaneck adopted a valid § 207(k) 
work period.  The Agreement provides, and Appellants 
concede, that police officers work either a seven-day or a 
nine-day period on a regularly recurring basis.  Indeed, 
Appellants fail to even assert now that they do not work a 
seven-day or a nine-day schedule.  Appellants' only 
contention is that the exemption does not apply because 
Teaneck did not intend to do so, which we now conclude is 
irrelevant as to whether an employer meets the requirements 
of § 207(k).  Because neither party disputes that the Teaneck 
police officers are engaged in law enforcement within the 
meaning of the FLSA, and the record supports a finding that 
the officers work either a seven-day or a nine-day schedule on 
a regularly recurring basis, it was proper for the District Court 
to conclude that Teaneck qualified for the § 207(k) 
exemption. 
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2.  Calculation of Overtime Damages 
When an employee brings a claim under the FLSA, he 
ordinarily bears "the burden of proving that he performed 
work for which he was not properly compensated."  Anderson 
v. Mt. Clemens Pottery, 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946), superseded 
by statute, Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-
262, as recognized in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 25-26 
(2005); see also Reich v. Gateway Press, Inc., 13 F.3d 685, 
701 (3d Cir. 1994).  Because the FLSA requires every 
employer to keep records of the "wages, hours, and other 
conditions and practices" of its employees, 29 U.S.C. § 
211(c), an employee easily discharges this burden by securing 
the production of those records, Anderson, 328 U.S. at 687.  
Such a burden becomes difficult to meet, however, where an 
employer has not maintained its records.  Martin v. Selker 
Bros., Inc., 949 F.2d 1286, 1297 (3d Cir. 1991).  Under those 
circumstances, "[t]he burden of any consequent imprecision 
[in an employee's calculation of damages] must be borne by 
th[e] employer," id. (citing Anderson, 328 U.S. at 688), and 
the employee will only be required to "submit sufficient 
evidence from which violations of the [FLSA] and the 
amount of an award may be reasonably inferred."  Id.  Once 
this inference is created, the burden shifts to the employer to 
rebut that inference.  Id. (citation omitted).     
Appellants argue that the District Court erroneously 
applied the burden of proof standard when it concluded that 
they failed to establish overtime damages.  Appellants argue 
that Teaneck’s records were so inaccurate as to render the 
proper calculation of damages impossible and, therefore, the 
burden of proof should have been shifted to Teaneck to rebut 
Appellants' proffered evidence.  Teaneck, on the other hand, 
argues that it did maintain adequate employment records.  
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Teaneck points out, however, that the District Court's entry of 
summary judgment resulted not from a failure to shift the 
burden of proof, but from Appellants' failure to set forth any 
evidence of alleged uncompensated overtime, whether it be 
actual or estimated.   
We agree with Teaneck's characterization of the 
District Court's opinion.  The District Court highlighted the 
fact that the only evidence submitted by the officers of 
alleged overtime damages was a spreadsheet, which based its 
calculations on the assumption that overtime accrued for any 
time worked beyond an eight-hour tour.  As the District Court 
correctly observed, such a framework does not provide any 
basis for discerning whether the hours worked by each 
individual officer exceeded the necessary threshold for 
overtime under the FLSA, which defines overtime entitlement 
based upon a work period and not a work day.  See, e.g., 29 
U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) ("no employer shall employ any of his 
employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours unless 
such employee receives compensation for [the excess hours] . 
. .").  The spreadsheet also fails to account for Teaneck's 
exemption under § 207(k), which increases the number of 
hours Teaneck officers may work in a work period before 
triggering overtime requirements.  See 29 C.F.R. § 553.230(c) 
(overtime threshold of 43 hours for seven-day cycles and 55 
hours for nine-day cycles).  An estimation of damage, which 
fails to set forth the proper method of calculation and does not 
account for day-to-day differences in officer scheduling, 
hardly provides a foundation for an inquiring court to 
"reasonably infer[]" FLSA violations or the amount of an 
award.  Martin, 949 F.2d at 1297. 
To be clear, the spreadsheet did indeed provide an 
estimation of muster time and time spent donning and 
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doffing, but it failed to make clear whether each officer 
worked the entirety of his or her tour or how that tour fit into 
each officer's broader work period.  Such a failure proves key 
here.  The uncontested facts demonstrate that: (1) a Tour 
Commander handwrites each officer’s scheduled hours on a 
"Daily Blotter", App. at 97; (2) the Daily Blotter records 
regularly scheduled hours, as well as muster time, overtime 
worked on a given day, sick time, vacation days or time due, 
and any shift exchanges among officers, id.; (3) Teaneck 
maintains, in addition to the Daily Blotter, records of the time 
officers actually work overtime pursuant to the Agreement, 
App. at 106; (4) when officers work overtime, they are 
required to punch a timecard, after which approval is obtained 
by a superior officer and eventually the Chief officer, id.; (5) 
officers are permitted to "sign out" with the Tour Commander 
during the last ten minutes of their eight hour and twenty 
minute tour, but still receive credit for the full eight hours and 
twenty minutes; and (6) Teaneck maintains overtime records, 
which reflect the reason for the overtime, necessary approvals 
for it, the method of compensation for it, and the overtime 
both worked and paid pursuant to the Agreement, id.   
Despite all of the above information, Appellants 
conceded that not a single officer was able to provide an 
estimate of his or her uncompensated overtime damages or 
time worked for which they believe they were not 
compensated.  App. at 116.  They also conceded that they 
were unable to provide any documentation that could be used 
to refute the hours set forth in Teaneck's records.  Id.  Amidst 
all of their concessions, Appellants do not argue that they 
lacked access to the records maintained by Teaneck, nor are 
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there any allegations that Teaneck withheld those records.
 3
  
Absent any evidence to support the officers' estimates of their 
overtime damages, Appellants' calculations on the 
spreadsheet become mere speculation, and are insufficient to 
support the requisite inference necessary to meet their burden.  
Martin, 949 F.2d at 1297 (the employee must "submit 
sufficient evidence from which violations of the [FLSA] and 
the amount of an award may be reasonably inferred.") 
(emphasis added).  Because Appellants had the burden of 
proving that they performed work for which they were not 
properly compensated, and failed to do so, the District Court 
                                              
3
 To be clear, our analysis does not reach the issue of 
whether Teaneck's records were adequate for purposes of 
recordkeeping requirements under the FLSA.  Our analysis 
merely notes that the parties do not dispute that certain 
records were made and highlights the fact that none of those 
records were used to support or refute estimates of overtime 
damages.   
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properly granted summary judgment on their claim for 
overtime damages.
4
     
B.  Muster Time 
Appellants next argue that the District Court 
incorrectly interpreted the Agreement in reaching the 
conclusion that Teaneck officers are compensated for muster 
time as a component of their base salaries.  They contend that 
the Agreement provides that officers are paid based upon an 
eight-hour tour of duty and, therefore, the additional twenty 
minutes of daily muster time constitutes time for which they 
are uncompensated.  Teaneck, on the other hand, argues that 
officers are paid for muster time as a component of their base 
salaries, and that officers have always been aware of this 
arrangement.  Teaneck points out that the parties have 
                                              
4
 Appellants dedicate a significant portion of their brief 
to arguments in support of their position that Teaneck failed 
to maintain its records.  Based upon this allegation, 
Appellants claim that the District Court should have "shifted 
the burden of proof" to Teaneck to rebut their proffered 
evidence of overtime damages.  As our analysis sets forth 
above, this argument misses the mark.  Regardless of whether 
Teaneck maintained its records or not, Appellants still had the 
burden, albeit more relaxed in the latter situation, to prove 
entitlement to overtime damages.  See Martin, 949 F.2d at 
1297 (noting that, where an employer has failed to maintain 
adequate records, the employee will only be required to 
"submit sufficient evidence from which violations of the 
[FLSA] and the amount of an award may be reasonably 
inferred.").  Because Appellants failed to set forth any 
evidence that would assist in even estimating damages, 
Appellants have not met their burden under either standard.    
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negotiated terms of employment and compensation for years 
through collective bargaining and it would make little sense 
for the officers to repeatedly enter into an agreement under 
which they performed uncompensated work.  This dispute, as 
the District Court correctly observed, presents a matter of 
contract interpretation.   
Although federal law governs the construction of a 
collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), traditional rules of 
contract interpretation apply when not inconsistent with 
federal labor law.  Teamsters Indus. Emps. Welfare Fund v. 
Rolls-Royce Motor Cars, Inc., 989 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 
1993).  "[W]here a court is called on to interpret a [CBA] it is 
generally appropriate for the court to look beyond the face of 
the [CBA]."  Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth. v. Bhd. of R.R. 
Signalmen, 882 F.2d 778, 784 (3d Cir. 1989).  The Supreme 
Court has affirmed this method of interpretation because: 
A [CBA] is not an ordinary 
contract for the purchase of goods 
and services, nor is it governed by 
the same old common-law 
concepts which control such 
private contracts.  It is a 
generalized code to govern a 
myriad of cases which the 
draftsman cannot wholly 
anticipate.  The collective 
agreement covers the whole 
employment relationship.  It calls 
into being a new common law – 




Transp.-Commc'n Emps. Union v. Union Pac. R.R., 385 U.S. 
157, 161 (1966) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Thus, when interpreting such agreements, "it is 
necessary to consider the scope of other related [CBAs], as 
well as practice, usage and custom pertaining to all such 
agreements."  Id.   
 Appellants set forth a number of arguments to support 
their position that muster time constitutes time for which 
officers are uncompensated.  None of those arguments 
provide any basis upon which we can rely in interpreting the 
Agreement and the employment relationship between the 
parties "as a whole."  For example, Appellants direct our 
attention to a section of the Agreement that states that officers 
are required to work an average of thirty-nine and a quarter 
hours per week over a calendar year cycle.  Appellants claim 
that it is "mathematically impossible to arrive at an eight-hour 
and twenty-minute tour and still work an average of thirty 
nine and a quarter hours per week."  We find this argument to 
be flawed.  The key language here is that officers work an 
average of thirty-nine and a quarter hours per week over a 
calendar year cycle.  The implication underlying this 
language is that some weekly hours will exceed that average 
and others will not.  Appellants concede that officers have 
been able to leave prior to the time indicated on the Daily 
Blotter and that they often do not actually attend twenty 
minutes of muster time per day.  Thus, it would appear that 
the Agreement accounts for early release, as well as the 
possibility of officers having to stay for a few extra minutes.  
Regardless, Appellants' calculations provide no basis for this 
Court to conclude, on the whole, that muster time is not 
compensated as a component of the officers' base salaries.   
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 The same can be said for Appellants' next argument.  
Appellants claim that the Agreement provides for overtime 
based on an eight-hour day, rather than an eight-hour and 
twenty-minute day.  Appellants point out that the Agreement 
provides for full overtime compensation once officers reach 
the overtime threshold; thus, it defies reason that Teaneck 
would pay twice for time it already deems compensated.  
Again, this argument fails to prove one way or another 
whether muster time is compensated as a component of the 
officers' base salaries.  The mere fact that the parties may 
have negotiated a generous overtime compensation package 
once a threshold timeframe is met provides little assistance in 
analyzing the question of muster time compensation.  
 Finally, Appellants direct our attention to two cases 
which they believe support their position that muster time 
should be compensated separately from their regular work 
schedules.  See O’Brien v. Town of Agawam, 350 F.3d 279, 
298 (1st Cir. 2003) (concluding that roll-call pay had to be 
included in officers' weekly hours worked under the FLSA 
and compensated as overtime since it pushed the officers' 
weekly hours worked over the forty-hour threshold); 
Barvinchak v. Ind. Reg’l Med. Ctr., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
72805 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2007) (analyzing the viability of a 
claim for straight time compensation under the FLSA where 
the plaintiff has worked overtime under § 207).  However, 
neither of those cases align factually with that of the instant 
case, nor does the same legal standard apply.  The Court in 
O'Brien, for example, found that the employer failed to 
establish a qualifying work period under § 207(k).  As a 
result, the employer was required to adhere to overtime 
requirements set forth in § 207(a)(1), which required that it 
pay overtime once an officer’s weekly hours exceeded the 40-
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hour threshold.  O'Brien, 350 F.3d at 297.  Here, Teaneck has 
established its eligibility for the § 207(k) exemption, so the 
overtime threshold for Teaneck officers is 43 hours for 
officers under the seven-day work plan and 55 hours for those 
under the nine-day plan.  See 29 C.F.R. § 553.230(c).  Twenty 
minutes of daily muster time for Teaneck officers, regardless 
of whether they work a "Five and Two" plan or the "Six and 
Three" plan, does not push them over the applicable overtime 
thresholds as it did in O'Brien.  Appellants' reliance on 
Barvinchak is similarly flawed as the Court's analysis was 
also based upon an overtime threshold of forty hours.    
 Turning to the Agreement in the instant matter, we 
think it is clear that muster time was contemplated as a 
component of the officers' base salaries.  Article VII of the 
Agreement sets forth that "[a] normal tour of duty shall be an 
eight (8) hour time division of the day for the purposes of 
assignment."  See App. at 96 (emphasis added).  That same 
section goes on to state that "[e]mployees will report for duty 
ten (10) minutes prior to the start of their tour . . . and . . . will 
be dismissed from duty ten (10) minutes after the end of their 
tour."  Id.  The only reasonable interpretation of this language 
is that an officer's work schedule, on any given day, is eight 
hours and twenty minutes.  Such a reading would therefore 
encompass the tour of duty, the assignment, and pre- and 
post-tour muster time.  This reading of the Agreement lends 
itself to the conclusion that muster time is a required 
component of an officer's daily tour schedule, a fact that both 
parties were aware of at the time employment-related 
negotiations took place.   
 We note that our conclusion is reinforced by the 
parties' extensive history of collective-bargaining 
negotiations, which began in 1979 and continued every few 
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years thereafter.  There is no indication that muster time has 
ever been treated as a separate entity from an officer’s normal 
tour of duty, or that it was ever compensated separately.  Nor 
is there any indication that the officers disputed the 
arrangement.  Taking the Agreement as a whole, combined 
with the actions of both parties over the course of thirty years, 
we conclude that Teaneck officers are compensated for 
muster time as a component of their negotiated salaries.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment as it relates to Appellants' claim regarding 
muster time. 
C.  Donning and Doffing 
 Appellants assert various arguments regarding their 
donning and doffing claim, including allegations that the 
District Court: (1) failed to consider that their uniforms are 
necessary to the principal work performed by the officers; (2) 
erred in holding that the uniforms are not for the benefit of 
the employer; (3) erred in concluding that § 203(o) of the 
FLSA applied to police uniforms; and (4) failed to consider 
their claim regarding safety equipment.  The arguments set 
forth by Appellants essentially claim that two exclusions to 




 and § 203(o), do not apply to their daily donning and 
doffing.  Because the § 203(o) exclusion speaks directly to 
the issue of clothes-changing time where a CBA governs the 
employment relationship between an employer and its 
employees, and a CBA governs the relationship between 
Teaneck and its officers, that is where we will begin our 
analysis.        
 Section 203(o) of the FLSA sets forth that, when 
determining hours worked for purposes of the wage and hour 
laws: 
[T]here shall be excluded any 
time spent in changing clothes or 
washing at the beginning or end 
of each workday which was 
excluded from measured working 
time during the week involved by 
the express terms of or by custom 
or practice under a bona fide 
collective-bargaining agreement 
applicable to the particular 
employee. 
                                              
5
 The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 relieves employers 
of responsibility for compensating employees for activities 
which are preliminary or postliminary to the principal activity 
or activities of a given job.  See 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2); 
Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 27.  Preliminary and postliminary 
activities are compensable under the FLSA only where "those 
activities are an integral and indispensable part of the 
principal activities for which covered workmen are employed 
and are not specifically excluded by [§ 254(a)(1)]."  Steiner v. 
Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956).   
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29 U.S.C. § 203(o); Turner v. City of Philadelphia, 262 F.3d 
222, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2001).  Essentially, where a CBA 
governs the relationship between an employer and its 
employees, employees will be foreclosed from seeking 
compensation for donning and doffing if the following are 
true: (1) donning and doffing was excluded from measured 
working time by the express terms, or by custom or practice, 
of a CBA; and (2) the donning and doffing involves clothes.  
See 29 U.S.C. § 203(o).  We will address each element in 
turn.   
1.  The Agreement 
 
 We note first that the express terms of the Agreement 
in this case are silent as to whether Teaneck officers are 
entitled to compensation for time spent donning and doffing.  
We, therefore, must determine whether there is a "custom or 
practice" under the Agreement of excluding change time from 
compensable hours worked.   
 We confronted this issue head on in Turner v. City of 
Philadelphia.  In that case, 200 current and former corrections 
officers brought a class action suit against the City of 
Philadelphia and the City Prisons Commissioner seeking 
overtime compensation under the FLSA for the time they 
spent changing into and out of their uniforms.  262 F.3d at 
224.  The express terms of the applicable CBA between the 
parties did not mention an exclusion of change time from 
hours worked and, therefore, the dispositive issue was 
whether there was a "custom or practice under a bona fide 
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collective-bargaining agreement" in the corrections system of 
excluding change time from compensable hours worked.  Id. 
at 225.  We concluded that there was.  Id. at 227.  In reaching 
this conclusion, we highlighted the district court’s reliance on 
the following undisputed facts: (1) the employer had not 
compensated corrections officers for change time for over 
thirty years; (2) every agreement between the officers and the 
employer had been silent as to compensation for uniform 
change time; (3) the union never made any requests for a 
uniform maintenance allowance or overtime compensation 
for mandatory pre-shift roll calls; and (4) the union never 
filed a grievance or demand for arbitration based on a lack of 
compensation for change time.  Id. at 225.  Because the facts 
established the officers’ long-standing acquiescence to a 
"custom or practice" of the non-compensability of change 
time, we affirmed the district court’s conclusion.  Id. at 227.   
 The instant case is factually similar to Turner.  The 
record demonstrates that the relationship between Teaneck 
and its police officers has been governed by CBAs for the 
past thirty years.  App. at 88.  During that time, and over the 
course of various periods of negotiation, none of the 
agreements have compensated police officers for change 
time.  App. at 116.  The record makes clear that the police 
officers' unions neither requested compensation for change 
time during those negotiations, nor did they even consider 
raising the issue.  Id.  Indeed, Appellants concede that 
Teaneck officers were aware that Teaneck had a policy of not 
providing additional compensation for donning and doffing 
and the unions never even filed a grievance or demand for 
arbitration based on such non-compensability.  Id.  Those 
facts certainly establish a longstanding acquiescence on the 
part of the officers and the unions to a "custom or practice" of 
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non-compensability of change time.  Because the facts 
indicate that there is a custom or practice under a bona fide 
CBA of not compensating Teaneck officers for time spent 
donning and doffing, the first element of § 203(o) applies.  
2.  Time Spent "Changing Clothes" 
 
 The Supreme Court recently defined the term 
"clothes," as used in § 203(o), as "items that are both 
designed and used to cover the body and are commonly 
regarded as articles of dress."  Sandifer v. United States Steel 
Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 877 (2014).  While the Court noted that 
its definition clearly "leaves room for distinguishing between 
clothes and wearable items that are not clothes, such as some 
equipment and devices," id. at 878, it cautioned that its 
"construction of 'clothes' does not exclude all objects that 
could conceivably be characterized as equipment," id. at 878 
n.6.   
 Where a court assesses the compensability of 
particular items for purposes of § 203(o), and the items in 
question fall within the above-stated definition of "clothes," 
time spent changing into and out of those items would be 
non-compensable.  See 29 U.S.C. § 203(o).  The analysis 
becomes more challenging where some items fall within the 
definition and others do not.   Mindful of the onerous task that 
would face federal judges when "separating the minutes spent 
clothes-changing and washing from the minutes devoted to 
other activities," the Supreme Court set forth the following 
guidelines:   
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The question for courts is whether 
the period at issue can, on the 
whole, be fairly characterized as 
'time spent in changing clothes or 
washing.'  If an employee devotes 
the vast majority of the time in 
question to putting on and off 
equipment or other nonclothes 
items . . . the entire period would 
not qualify as 'time spent in 
changing clothes' under § 203(o), 
even if some clothes items were 
donned and doffed as well.  But if 
the vast majority of the time is 
spent in donning and doffing 
'clothes' as we have defined that 
term, the entire period qualifies, 
and the time spent putting on and 
off other items need not be 
subtracted. 
 
Sandifer, 134 S. Ct. at 881 (emphasis in original).   
 
 Applying the foregoing principles to the facts of this 
case, we hold that Appellants' donning and doffing of the 
uniforms and equipment at issue qualifies as "changing 
clothes" within the meaning of § 203(o).  Appellants have 
pointed to the following items for Uniform Division officers: 
a uniform hat; uniform jacket; shirts; pants; dress blouse; 
leather gear; shoes/boots; socks; tie; winter/summer uniform; 
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sweaters; gloves; rainwear; bullet resistant vest; nightstick; 
handcuffs; nameplate; medals; awards; Shield and 
Department I.D. card; notebook and pen; firearm and 
ammunition; whistle; baton; watch; pepper spray (when 
issued); and a flashlight.
6
  The first fourteen items clearly fit 
within the Supreme Court's definition of "clothes" set forth 
above:
 
"they are both designed and used to cover the body 
and are commonly regarded as articles of dress."
 7
  See id. at 
879.  The last thirteen items, by contrast, do not satisfy the 
standard.  We recognize that the number in each category is 
close, but we cannot say that the "vast majority of the time in 
question" is spent picking up, for example, a nightstick, 
handcuffs, nameplate, medals, awards, and a flashlight, or 
maintaining a department identification card and notebook 
and pen.  Clearly, picking up and maintaining those items is 
not the same as donning and doffing the clothing at issue 
here.  Accordingly, the vast majority of the time in question is 
spent donning and doffing "clothes" for purposes of § 203(o).  
Therefore, the entire period qualifies as time spent changing 
clothes or washing, and the time spent picking up or 
maintaining the other items need not be subtracted.       
                                              
6
 Non-Uniform Division officers must have a 
conforming uniform available at all times and are subject to 
other requirements regarding their business garb, the majority 
of which consists of items that fit plainly within the definition 
of "clothes."  App. at 110-111.   
7
 Neither the District Court nor the parties to the case 
define or describe "leather gear."  We presume it to mean 
holsters, belts, straps, boots, gloves and/or jackets, most of 
which are "clothes."        
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 In sum, we conclude that there is a custom or practice 
under a bona fide CBA of not compensating Teaneck officers 
for time spent donning and doffing, and that the vast majority 
of the time in question is spent changing "clothes," as defined 
by the Supreme Court.  Because both elements necessary for 
application of the § 203(o) exclusion apply to the instant case, 
the Teaneck officers are precluded from seeking 
compensation for time spent donning and doffing their 
uniforms and safety equipment.
8
  Accordingly, we will affirm 
the District Court's grant of summary judgment as it relates to 
Appellants' donning and doffing claim. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
order of the District Court. 
                                              
8
 Because the § 203(o) exclusion applies, we need not 
address Appellants' argument that the remaining exclusion, 
regarding the preliminary and postliminary activities, does 
not apply. 
